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Introduction
The article deals with the theme of the subject in politics and law, which is essentially 
also the theme of who speaks. A focus on the voice is regarded here as paramount. It 
is assumed that the current subject of politics and law is a cut subject, divested of the 
body and oneself, construed as a vertical, autonomous, independent and self-coherent 
individual who has no body but only righteous relations to the others and the com-
munity around. It is a subject that has been split and essentialised into sovereign and 
metaphysical ideas. 
As a result, the current ideological, normative, and symbolic frame produces and 
reproduces a way of speaking and doing politics that is voiceless and devocalized. While 
by democracy people are asked to speak their voices, in reality they are just caught in 
the situation of the already given and sovereign linguistic frame. The point of the paper 
consists of imagining ourselves and the world of relations around us from who speaks 
and one’s voice, that is by beginning from oneself rather than from the general voice of 
politics and law, and thus in a sort of renegotiation of the terms of the political subject 
and its community. To do this, the paper employs the radical perspectives of Adriana 
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Cavarero, comparing it with the subversive approach proposed by Judith Butler and the 
reformist viewpoints of John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum. 
Both Rawls and Nussbaum attempt to renegotiate the liberal subject and to give 
more voice to people, to achieve justice. Yet, they seem to maintain the same ontological 
thinking of a split and cut subject divested from the body and life, where one can only 
speak with the voice already thought by standard political and legal discourses. On the 
contrary, Butler and Cavarero go further by showing a concern for materiality, singu-
larity and a justice outside the liberal grid. Yet, it is only with Cavarero that a disengage-
ment from the sovereign symbolic order appears possible. 
Cavarero’s approach draws on the work of the Italian feminists in the 1980s, who 
created women’s centres, bookshops, libraries as places of detachment from exist-
ing dominating institutions, where women could separate themselves from mascu-
line systems of thought1. Those Italian women’s centres were spaces where singular 
voices could experience independence and freedom from the sovereign subjectivity 
and symbolic order. What is important is that those centres emphasized a politics of 
differences among selves rather than an emancipatory politics of equality between 
women and men. Drawing on such initial legacy, Cavarero offers, via the voice, politi-
cal forms of renegotiation that suspends the normative institutional framework while 
engaging with it2. 
Rawls and Nussbaum’s engagement with the liberal politics
Today, Rawls’ theory of distribution of the goods and his principle of difference, 
finds application in the welfare state of most of the Western liberal democracies. The 
approach constructed by Rawls is interesting, because while it remains within the con-
straints of legal liberalism and individual rights, it attempts to renegotiate the political 
inequality and injustice within Liberalism. 
A society is just for Rawls, if it promotes a common held good in legal institutions. 
The basic structure consists of the way institutions distribute fundamental rights and 
duties and thus resolve conflicts fairly3. Individuals can choose a basic structure from an 
“original position”. The original position implies that people are “individuals” who do 
1. See P. Bono, S. Kemp, Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991. 
2. See A. Cavarero, For More than One Voice. Towards a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, University of Stanford Press, Stan-
ford, 2005.
3. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971, p. 12. 
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not know things about themselves; they are blindfolded with a veil of ignorance, so that 
they are prevented from knowing about time, history or class4. 
The conception of an original position appears necessary for individuals to accept 
justice and ignore themselves, their different welfare and their divergent life projects. 
The veil of ignorance forces people to think about the problem of social justice from 
an impartial point of view and implements a moral attitude and justice as fairness in 
people5. 
Through the veil of ignorance people are supposed to always act rationally, that is, 
people will choose primary goods as the most important ones. However, we think that 
while the veil of ignorance places each individual on equal footing with one another, at 
the same time the individual appears to be completely disconnected and cut from the 
materiality and circumstances in which is situated. 
Rawls later modified the concept of the original position and the veil of ignorance. 
He refined his perspective arguing that citizens, who hold opposing conceptions of 
equality in society, can find a shared basis of ‘reasonable’ agreement through an overlap-
ping consensus6. Interestingly, ‘reasonable’ for Rawls has to do with choosing the good 
for society that is choosing the already established egalitarian distribution and the prin-
ciple of difference. The individual is asked to act and speak in a reasonable way. 
Let us think more closely about the implications of such a perspective in relation 
to one’s voice and political renegotiation. Despite the terms of co-operation and the 
intent to ensure justice, Rawls’ theory of the political reflects a monovalent perspective 
of community and sharing. The idea of the veil of ignorance is emblematic of the ar-
tificiality of the context necessary for his intent to distribute equally to everyone. For 
Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Rawls’ theory fails in fact to account for the pain 
and vulnerability of the people before law and justice, since law and justice appear to be 
concerned only with distributions, investments and returns7. 
However according to Rawls, a person is only an individual with no unique face or 
body and no relationality, except the relation to the just principle of distribution. The 
other is not even another but the same, to whom it is necessary to distribute goods, 
according to the established and normative difference principle. 
4. See ibid., p. 17.
5. See F. Lovett, Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. A Reader’s Guide, Continuum, London, 2011, p. 20. 
6. See J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996.
7. See C. Douzinas, A. Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence. The Political Philosophy of Justice, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 130.
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Consequently, his theory can be claimed to be structured on a false choice8. Žižek 
explains how Rawls’ freedom and liberty of choice are possible only if one makes the 
right choice, which is the predicted choice of sameness and distribution. The ‘reasonable’ 
choice is to accept the sacrifice of what is superfluous9. People who fall short of the sub-
jectivity of the same are left unheard since the only possible choice is the right choice10, 
the only voice is the abstract and the semantic voice of the liberal frame. 
A more recent liberal approach to resistance has been offered by the capability the-
ory of Martha Nussbaum. Her approach has been used by the United Nations during 
the 1980s to adjust development concerns in so-called developing countries. Her ap-
proach counters in some ways the Rawlsian theory of justice focused on goods with an 
approach grounded on capabilities11. Importance is given to capabilities rather than the 
mere acquisition and distribution of goods. The capability theory attempts to adapt 
liberalism to difference, by organising a set of good capabilities to human functioning. 
Unlike Rawls, Nussbaum’s theory presupposes that human beings differ from one 
another and people are contextualised in their reality12. For Nussbaum, people live in 
different natural and social contexts and have specific personal characteristics, such as 
age, sex, physical and mental abilities13. 
Her approach, therefore, does not focus only on the distribution of resources, but 
rather resources acquire value in promoting human functioning. She points out that 
human functioning is paramount in converting resources and giving them value. If a 
human being is unable to convert a resource into a valuable functioning because of a 
disability, such a human being is put into a position of inequality. 
For Rawls, justice and equality among subjects are achieved through the distribution 
of goods and this is what is supposed to materialise his life projects. Whereas, for Nuss-
baum, justice and equality are achieved when human beings reach a level of capability 
to function. This implies distribution but also the elimination of obstacles that impede 
the good functioning. The aim is therefore, to ensure that resources promote capacities 
and good human functioning. In a way, this allows the abstraction of liberalism to be 
accommodated to more practical human needs. We can say that by paying attention to 
the individual’s access to human functioning, Nussbaum’s theory raises more awareness 
8. See S. Žižek, Enjoy your Simptom: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out, Routledge, New York, 1992, pp. 69-110.
9. See ibid.
10. See S. Žižek, Plague of Fantasies, Verso, London, 1997.
11. See M. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.
12. See ibid.
13. See ibid.
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of the economic injustices inflicted upon women and other groups that are more vul-
nerable and excluded. 
Yet, at the core of Nussbaum’s theory of Justice or capability to function lies the Uni-
versalism of equal worth of the individual14. The idea of dignity and equal worth means 
that all people equally deserve respect and this links to their liberty and to a liberal con-
ception of life. Each human being should be regarded as an end rather than as a means to 
an end15. The goal of the idea of the capability to function is to treat people in a dignified 
and equal way. For Nussbaum, the Universalism of liberal justice needs to be guided 
towards what is good for people, that is, towards basic human functions and capacities. 
Although Nussbaum appears to adjust some aspects of the Rawlsian theory, some 
critical legal theorists have underlined the problems in her approach. For instance, Kar-
in Van Marle has argued that Nussbaum’s approach contains a paternalistic viewpoint16. 
Despite Nussbaum’s assertion of Universalism not being incompatible with people’s 
choice, the use of a standard shows no respect for the voice of people as agents. Whereas, 
for Loizidou, Nussbaum’s theory of resistance presumes to know the needs and desires 
of others, but in reality Nussbaum’s theory affirms law’s sovereignty over the voice of 
people17. 
The theory has attracted criticism by other scholars as well. For instance, Thomas 
Pogge argues that in Nussbaum’s approach human diversity is conceived as vertical and 
this is incompatible with the ethos of human democracy, based on horizontal equality18. 
The specific political focus is thus always on a human being, who needs to be confronted 
with a set of better standards of functioning and capabilities. 
Furthermore, Persio Tincani has noted the deep similarity and interconnections be-
tween the two theories of Rawls and Nussbaum19. For Tincani, basic goods and capa-
bilities are not alternative political concepts, but diverse gradation of the same liberal 
argument20. Basic goods contribute, in fact, to the realization of capabilities. A theory of 
justice based on the distribution makes sure that institutions provide individuals with 
a minimum content of goods; whereas, theories based on capability require instead 
that institutions guarantee people a minimum level of functioning21. The politics of 
14. See M. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capability Approach, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 32. 
15. See ibid. 
16. See K. Van Marle, “The Capabilities Approach, the Imaginary Domain and the Asymmetrical Reciprocity: Feminist 
Perspectives on Equality and Justice”, in Feminist Legal Studies, 11, 2003, pp. 255-278. 
17. See E. Loizidou, Judith Butler: Ethics, Law, Politics, Cavendish Publishing, Oxon, 2007, p. 165. 
18. See T.W. Pogge, “Can the Capability approach Be Justified?”, in Philosophical Topics, 30.2, 2002, pp. 167-228. 
19. See P. Tincani, “I beni principali come capacitazioni”, in Politeia, 83, 2006, pp. 21-44. 
20. See ibid.
21. See ibid.
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distribution, of standardization and regulation of voices remains fundamental in both 
theories. The subject remains general and no account of one’s singularity is available22. 
It follows that the effect in both Rawls and Nussbaum’s political renegotiation may 
be a theorising of an unvoiced subject in an abstract and unvoiced community: a sub-
ject whose voice has been taken away, buried, concealed and hidden behind sovereign 
politics, law and rights. The speaking subject Rawls and Nussbaum talks about is con-
structed through the logic of Oneness: one as a general and as a socio-linguistic subject. 
Heteronomy and needs are equated to one good standard and people are deprived of 
their unique corporeal specific voices. 
Radical Political renegotiation through critical ruptures and one’s 
voice
In this section we are going to focus on more radical forms of political renegotia-
tion, beyond the reformist liberal perspective, in particular on the work of Judith Butler 
and Adriana Cavarero. Butler is well known for having theorised a form of resistance 
and political re-negotiation as subversion of the subject against the normative system 
of forced choice, in which, the subject itself is defined. It is important to acknowledge 
the Hegelian root of her subject and political theory in order to understand Butler’s 
thought. Such Hegelian root is especially evident in her first work, Subjects of Desire23. 
She also refers to Hegel in the book Contingency, Hegemony, Universality24. 
Desire and recognition are fundamental aspects of Butler’s performative politics, 
centred in the ecstatic self. “Ecstatic” in Greek means standing out and refers to being 
dependent on something outside of itself. In other words, a subject is standing out or 
is separated from itself and this appears to be a condition of the subject’s existence in 
Butler. In Subjects of Desire, the ecstatic character of the subject means that the subject 
repeatedly finds itself outside of itself and never returns to itself, to its initial form, but 
it transforms itself during the ecstatic process. 
In her theory, all identities necessarily fail, because all universal truths and norma-
tive linguistic structures, like law and justice, end up refuting the other and produce 
22. See ibid.
23. See J. Butler, Subjects of Desire. Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, Columbia University Press, New York, 
1987. 
24. See J. Butler, E. Laclau, S. Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, Verso, Lon-
don, 2000.
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inevitably exclusion and abjection. Consequently, for Butler, all political terms need 
to be contested, questioned, subverted and renegotiated. It follows that for Butler, the 
Hegelian recognition becomes an impossibility, a continuous process of struggle, and 
perhaps, a way of striving for the impossible. Her work can be understood as a form 
of resistance against the fixation of the ideological frame and the violence of subject 
formation. According to Butler, the subject appears as necessarily located within the 
symbolic structures, always wholly connected with the dominating structures of so-
cio-linguistic-cultural and legal norms, as in the case of sex or gender. The latter are 
seen as normative linguistic constructions of the body.
In Frames of Wars, Butler writes five essays in response to war, where the themes of 
vulnerability and precariety and their denial become central themes25. Butler argues 
that the linguistic and ideological frame, not only regulates reality, but also participates 
in producing reality and thus materiality and our bodies26. An important point is that 
the frame leaves something cut out from it. Not all life is captured and recognised by the 
normative conditions of the frame. Rather, something exceeds the frame. 
There are moments when the frame is broken down and there is a certain release of 
control27. Leakages of the frame might show the excess, namely, what is excluded and 
abjected by the frame28. By repeating normative structures through bodily and linguistic 
acts, it is possible to find moments of failure of the system of forced constructions, and 
therefore, enact change and also make vulnerability equally shared. The problem, for 
Butler, becomes also an ontological problem. There is a given ontological way of ap-
proaching the body that allows, or does not allow, the apprehension of its vulnerability. 
For Butler, a different ontology that focuses on vulnerability can be used as a way to 
re-think our responsibility. 
However, rethinking responsibility is a process always mediated by the frame, by 
the subject’s ecstatic outside; namely, the socio-linguistic conditions and political in-
stitutions. In particular, Butler suggests that to speak against and resist the process of 
abjection and exclusion by the normative frame, it is necessary that vulnerability and 
precariousness are apprehended and shared equally among us. It follows that we must 
deal in any case with those normative institutional frameworks, if we want to rethink 
their terms in new ways29. 
25. See J. Butler, Frames of War. When Is Life Grievable?, Verso, London, 2010.
26. See ibid.
27. See ibid.
28. See ibid.
29. See ibid., p. 145. 
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Differently from Butler, Adriana Cavarero puts at the centre of her theory of resis-
tance the corporeal and singular voice30. It is in such a voice that she sees the possibility to 
resist the metaphysical sovereign tradition of discourses. For Cavarero, the logocentric 
and metaphysical tradition insists on the what is said and does not attend the who is 
saying. The who is saying (a mouth and a voice) is regarded to be inessential and super-
fluous and is excluded from the process of the communication and signification. In her 
theory, Cavarero does not wish to avoid language and signification; on the contrary, Ca-
varero is searching for the very meaning of the already said and signification. For Cava-
rero, the voice cannot be cut out from what is said. Speaking in one’s voice is a moment 
of radically singular materiality that begins with an awareness of oneself in relation to 
another. There is a radical proximity between unique beings that simply communicate 
without necessarily communicating something. Cavarero’s way of resistance and politi-
cal renegotiation emerges, then as a reciprocal communication of unique voices and as 
something that springs from within us.
In her book Relating Narratives, Cavarero reveals her roots in the work of Hannah 
Arendt31. In The Human Condition, Arendt asserts that what counts in politics is not the 
what but rather the who of people; while speaking and acting, one reveals one’s unique-
ness32. Cavarero underlines the materiality and the vulnerability of such singular human 
uniqueness already commenced by Arendt. The core point of Relating Narratives is the 
ontology behind telling one’s life story, a story necessarily exposed to others33. Life sto-
ries are always new and unique. They reveal a unique who beyond the what. Therefore, 
the ontology behind such a who-ness, is an ontology that is anti-metaphysical and con-
tingent. 
The focus on uniqueness and singular corporeality suspends the metaphysical and 
sovereign talking of fixed identities and opens unexpected spaces of resistance detached 
from the already narrated language. Cavarero’s work is not about identity, or the in-
dividual, or the what –those are to be considered as only limited and constructed as-
pects of us that separate and cut out one’s uniqueness, singularity, corporeality and 
relationality. In this respect, we can consider the political and the normative subject as 
a cut subject, a subject that does not include the traits of who-ness and singularity that 
Cavarero reflects. 
30. See A. Cavarero, For More than One Voice. 
31. See A. Cavarero, Relating Narrative. Storytelling and Selfhood, Routledge, London, 2000. 
32. See H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1958. 
33. See A. Cavarero, Relating Narratives. 
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In her most recent book, Inclinazioni, Cavarero speculates on the Western philo-
sophical subjectivity appropriated by politics, law and rights, where the subject has been 
thought since the beginning in the terms of ‘homo erectus’, as vertical, right, straight34. 
The verticality of the Western subjectivity indicates a self-referential and isolated sub-
ject that stands up in the arrogant act of his own foundation, speaks with the voice 
of rectitude, rules and order. To such a vertical ontology, Cavarero counter-opposes 
an ontology of inclination, where the subject precisely bends towards the other and 
engages in relations within a community of unique beings. Such an inclined and re-
lational ontology indicates a constitutive inclination of us as unique living beings and 
our relationality to others. An inclined subject is no longer straight, it bends as respect 
to the vertical axis. A subject characterised by inclination is also a subject that speaks in 
her own voice, that lives the material life with her unique body and is aware of her own 
vulnerability and that of others. 
Yet, it is specifically in her work entitled For More than One Voice that Cavarero em-
phasises the primacy of the in-articulated voice, the coming of voice and the breathing 
from the mouth35. She detects in the voice a space of meaning independent from speech. 
The voice constitutes the unexpressed side of speech; it generates and exceeds speech. The 
voice, Cavarero says, communicates uniqueness beyond the contents of communication: 
We become aware of our uniqueness in relationality with others. 
Cavarero engaged closely with the theme of vulnerability in her book Horrorism36. 
Here Cavarero talks of vulnerability referring often to the Latin term of vulnus. We are 
inevitably exposed to each other in our vulnerability. For Cavarero, we can choose to 
act towards the others with care or by inflicting wounds. We can say that if one speaks 
as a subject constituted by language and norms, one speaks as a cut subject, separated 
from one’s uniqueness and body and from the others. From such a position, it is easy 
to react by inflicting wounds, with disregard for vulnerability, because the subject is cut 
and separated from oneself and others.
Whereas, if one speaks in one’s voice, one is exposed to oneself and others, one is 
aware of one’s vulnerability and that of others. Such an awareness pushes towards re-
sponding to the vulnus with care and attending to the other with care. Thus, the voice as 
awareness of singularity, corporeality and vulnerability, leads to an ethical response to 
vulnerability and, therefore, to choose care. 
34. See A. Cavarero, Inclinazioni. Critica della Rettitudine, Raffaella Cortina, Milano, 2013. 
35. See A. Cavarero, For More than One Voice. 
36. See A. Cavarero, Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009. 
Elisabetta R. Bertolino  WHO SPEAKS? RENEGOTIATING SOVEREIGN AND METAPHYSICAL DISCOURSES
210
Soft Power          Volumen 4, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2016
What is said has implications for a radical political renegotiation and a conception 
of justice otherwise. Cavarero is not trying to make of the subject a better normative 
and sovereign subject, but she is only emphasising the non-sovereign and non-norma-
tive aspects of being. The focus on who someone is in Cavarero, rather than the what 
of identity and subjectivity, indicates that it is possible to make use of a different type 
of agency, other than that of sovereignty, that does not require to master others, and 
moreover, can suspend –even if for shortly– the sovereign frame. The who –on which 
both Arendt and Cavarero focus– excludes the sovereign subject because there is no 
substance, it is impossible to say who someone is. The who-ness is only manifested or 
revealed through the voice or action and in a condition of relationality and plurality. 
Subsequently, we could argue that there is also a diverse understanding of the on-
tology at stake in Cavarero. This is not ontology as metaphysics or presence of things, 
truths or norms. It is rather contingent, changeable and corporeal. Cavarero’s voice is 
never the same –my voice is never your voice. The space for speaking or acting in plu-
rality is contingent, not defined or fixed. It is rather shaped during the journey of ex-
perience. 
Therefore, for Cavarero, as for Arendt, the community is not originated or guar-
anteed in politics. For both, the community of unique beings lies in a space that is 
revealed, or appears, precisely when we focus on the voice or we act unpredictably; that 
is, when we speak and act from a radical awareness of ourselves and others, in the con-
dition of corporeal vulnerability, in which, we are all inevitably situated. 
From this perspective, there is no more appropriation of linguistic structures to be able 
to speak, but the only exposure of one’s voice and who one is. One’s voice cannot be re-
duced or metabolised into sovereign discourses. If my voice is just any voice, then my voice 
is general and can be easily predicted. On the contrary, there are no predictions about my 
unique voice. Thus, my voice is a rupture with the very logic of signification assigned to 
the current unvoiced political subjectivity and ideologically sovereign framework. 
The voicing of uniqueness has also the ethical implications for justice. In the Human 
Condition, Arendt links action to forgiveness37. Forgiveness is a special action, which is 
boundless and potentially capable of breaking the multiple divisions produced by vio-
lence between people. 
Forgiveness is an action that surely springs from one’s who-ness and we can then 
deduce an awareness of one’s vulnerability and thus an account of oneself. It could be 
37. See H. Arendt, The Human Condition.
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argued that Arendt’s conceptualisation of action and forgiveness-as-action, as a deep 
awareness of one’s vulnerability and the vulnerability of others, incorporates a material-
ist perspective. I forgive because I can see the vulnerability of another self behind the 
wrong action, the doer behind the deed. It is only by being aware of the vulnerability of 
the other and of one’s vulnerability that one can attempt to enact forgiveness. 
Forgiveness becomes an example of producing something new through our actions, 
something unexpected, natality, something that sets us apart from the sovereign frame 
and from the justice of politics, law, an expression of one’s voice as well. Forgiveness is 
linked to an ability to respond ethically to vulnerability. On the contrary, the justice of 
Western politics and law is projected towards further divisions between people, and lies 
on resentment and retribution. Justice appears to be a righteous reaction to an injury. 
Ethics requires speaking in one’s voice, or acting anew producing a response in terms 
of an ability to respond with responsability to the vulnerability of others. The relation 
to others, as perceived here, goes beyond the linguistic agent-subject relation, because 
it suspends the said of language and works on one’s voice unpredictability of the saying 
and towards the vulnerability of others. 
Butler also attempts to deal with the problem of ethics, but she poses a different 
ethical question38. Unlike Cavarero’s and Arendt’s whoness, the Butlerian subject is in-
tegrally involved in social, cultural and legal norms. Life, for Butler, cannot escape its 
fundamental linkage to subjectivity and identity. It is in relation to norms and intelli-
gibility that life is taken into account. The agent in Butler is a subject who knows she 
cannot become fully aware of herself and fully speak for herself. And yet, it is precisely 
this fallibility and lack of self-coherence that allows an acknowledgment of the limits of 
self-understanding and provides a sort of ethical critical agency39. 
For Butler, material life and the potential to speak can only be enacted through the 
norms and the forms of the linguistic sovereignty. By performing norms, the subject 
can achieve new ways of expression and liveability in relation to the normative space. In 
addition, the relation to the other in Butler is ecstatic. This means that the subject finds 
itself outside itself. Responding ethically then requires the medium of such ecstatic out-
side, the linguistic and normative frame through which we can perform our subjectivity 
and be critical of this performance. 
38. See J. Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, Fordham University Press, New York, 2005.
39. See ibid.
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Conclusion 
To conclude, Rawls, Nussbaum, Butler and Cavarero are all interested in resisting the 
current liberal approach and renegotiate its political limits. However, we can identify 
three opposing attitudes. Rawls and Nussbaum –although not insensitive to difference– 
continue to maintain the framework of universal subjectivity, choice and voice in their 
engagement with political and legal liberal institutions. Both Rawls and Nussbaum, ac-
cept the notion of political liberalism as a good framework. 
Butler and Cavarero, however, are arguably more critical of Universalism and strive 
to account for what is cut out, made superfluous and exceeds the law. In comparing But-
ler and Cavarero, we see that both begin from positions of radical materiality and ac-
knowledgment of vulnerability. Butler employs the linguistic and normative framework 
as integrally connected to materiality, emphasises Hegel’s ecstatic outside and shows the 
necessary struggle of the subject outside itself. For Butler, it is important to be critical of 
such an outside, while at the same time, one is inescapably immersed in it. 
On the contrary, Cavarero joins Butler in her critique of the subject as being forced 
and separated from singularity, as the result of the identity formation process, but fol-
lows the Arendtian root of uniqueness. The subject in Cavarero is rather characterised 
by inclination, that is, by leaning out, the linguistic subject moves in some ways outside 
the vertical and linguistic direction in which it has been conceived and relates to oth-
ers through dependence and inclination. One’s voice is the moment, when one escapes 
the verticality of the subject and becomes aware of inclination. Through one’s voice, 
one’s vulnerability is exposed to oneself and others. This opens an ethics of a singular-
ity-in-relatedness that can act in ways totally unpredictable and poses new paths for a 
political renegotiation and justice
Yet, it seems impossible to permanently suspend politics, law and their institutions, 
to remain beyond them and take a complete non-political or non-juridical stance, when 
resisting them. In other words, it may be impossible to resist politics and law through 
a complete dissociation from any reference to policies, rules, procedures or norms and 
institutions. 
Consequently, it becomes necessary to look into the wider engagement with poli-
tics and law. In Politics, Postmodernity and Critical Legal Studies, both Peter Goodrich 
and Costas Douzinas, argue for instance for an ethicality in the critique and resistance 
of politics and law and the necessity to open a space for a diverse ontology or being 
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within institutions40. Goodrich and Douzinas seem to suggest that the moments of 
disconnection from politics and law and institutions cannot be permanent and thus, 
a way of connecting, in terms of ontology and ethics, appears necessary41. Political 
renegotiation might reside in the responsibility to respond in ethical ways that are 
beyond politics and law-making by focusing on what remains unbound by politics 
and law, on that which is not part of them, but that comes into terms with them. One’s 
voice implies an emphasis on what exceeds politics and law and an ethical responsibil-
ity to choose care towards vulnerability. The voice calls for an ontology of a selfhood 
in flesh and blood, unique and relational with a focus on ethical thinking and acting. 
For Cavarero, this can lead also to act strategically. As Cavarero makes clear in an in-
terview, resistance cannot be exhausted at the moment of suspension from the pre-es-
tablished order by the voice42. On the contrary, it is necessary also to use strategically 
institutions or the master’s tools, with cattive intenzioni (bad intentions) to radically 
push towards a renegotiating of who speaks in contingency and ethics, within a com-
munity of relational and unique selves.
40. See C. Douzinas, P. Goodrich, Y. Hachamovitch, Politics, Postmodernity and Critical Legal Studies: The Legality and the 
Contingent, Routledge, New York, 1994, p. 131. 
41. See ibid. 
42. See A. Cavarero, E. Bertolino, “Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with the Italian Philosopher 
Adriana Cavarero”, in differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 19.1, 2008, p. 137.
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